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Abstract
The eight years from 2000 to 2008 saw a rapid growth in the use of securitization by UK
banks. We aim to identify the reasons that contributed to this rapid growth. The time period
(2000 to 2010) covered by our study is noteworthy as it covers the pre-nancial crisis credit-
boom, the peak of the nancial crisis and its aftermath. In the wake of the nancial crisis,
many governments, regulators and political commentators have pointed an accusing nger at
the securitization market - even in the absence of a detailed statistical and economic analysis.
We contribute to the extant literature by performing such an analysis on UK banks, fo-
cussing principally on whether it is the need for liquidity (i.e. the funding of their balance
sheets), or the desire to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage or the need for credit risk trans-
fer that has led to UK banks securitizing their assets.
We show that securitization has been signicantly driven by liquidity reasons. In addition,
we observe a positive link between securitization and banks credit risk. We interpret these
latter ndings as evidence that UK banks which engaged in securitization did so, in part, to
transfer credit risk and that, in comparison to UK banks which did not use securitization, they
had more credit risk to transfer in the sense that they originated lower quality loans and held
lower quality assets. We show that banks which issued more asset-backed securities before the
nancial crisis su¤ered more defaults after the nancial crisis.
JEL Classication: G21, G28
Acknowledgement 1 We are grateful to Jo Danbolt and Hong Liu for comments. The usual
disclaimer applies
1 Introduction
Securitization has been perceived as one of the most prominent developments in the international
nancial markets in recent decades.
In this study we consider securitization as the process by which heterogenous and illiquid credit-
risky assets (e.g. bank loans) or instruments (e.g. a portfolio of bonds or credit default swaps) are
pooled and repackaged into marketable securities; where risks related to these assets or instruments
are separated from the transferrers (i.e. the originators) own credit and operating risk, and where
securities are issued to investors which are designed for the specic risk tolerance prole of such
investors. Therefore, we dene securitization as the whole process whereby a bank or other nancial
institution issues marketable securities backed by the cash ows from a pool of underlying assets
or instruments.
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The securitization or repackaging process leads to three potential benets for investors: Firstly,
the potential benet to create securities with a specic risk-reward prole (e.g. the di¤erent tranches
of asset-backed securities (ABSs) or collateralised debt obligations (CDOs)) for investors; secondly,
the inclusion of many di¤erent assets or instruments may diversify (and hence reduce) the credit
risk faced by investors (at potentially lower cost than the investors could themselves diversify);
thirdly, the repackaging process may lead to securities which are more readily marketable and more
liquid than ownership interests in and loans against the underlying assets.
With each potential benet comes a potential drawback for investors: Firstly, the repackaging
process may lead to a lack of transparency or a delegation of the due diligence process to other
parties (such as the originating bank itself (which has its best interests at heart and not those of
the investors) or a ratings agency); secondly, the diversication of idiosyncratic risk may be illusory
in the sense that default correlations are low in good economic times but may become very high in
a credit-crunch or a recession; thirdly, there may be a perception of liquidity in a bull market but,
in fact, liquidity in the market dried-up abruptly and completely in the summer of 2007.
From the point of view of the originating banks, there are three potential benets to be gained
by securitization: Firstly, the repackaging and sale of the banksloans results in an inow of cash
and hence securitization enables the bank to fund itself; secondly, the transfer of credit risk to a
third party - this means that, even if a bank has already lent substantially to a particular borrower
or group of borrowers (for example, within a specic geographical region or sector of the economy),
it can continue to lend to this same group (perhaps, for relationship reasons) because the transfer of
credit risk, via securitization, reduces the issuing banks concentration risk; thirdly, securitization
may reduce the banksregulatory capital requirements.
The process whereby a bank securitizes its loans and sells them onto third parties is usually
termed the originate-to-distribute" (OTD) model (as opposed to the traditional loan-and-hold"
model of using deposits to nance loans and holding the loans until maturity).
For part of our empirical analysis (section 5.3), we will draw a distinction between asset-backed
securities (ABSs) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). The former repackage the originating
banks assets (i.e. loans) while the latter repackage the banks liabilities or synthetic instruments
such as a portfolio of bonds or credit default swaps.
Despite the size of the securitization markets and the popular viewpoint that securitization
partially lead to the nancial crisis, there have been only a few studies which have tried to shed
some light on why banks used securitization and the e¤ect of the OTD business model on banks
balance sheets after the nancial crisis. In this paper, we attempt to address these issues using a
unique dataset for UK banks. We seek to determine whether the liquidity motive is the dominant
one or, on the other hand, whether it is the regulatory capital arbitrage or the credit risk transfer
reasons that drove the increased securitization by UK banks before the nancial crisis. We focus on
the UK since it can be regarded as the securitization laboratory of the world. In fact, many of the
securitization products widely used by the nancial industry across the world have been developed
in the UK. Furthermore, the UK securitization market is the largest market in Europe.
In contrast to most other studies that have considered the aggregate securitization (i.e. including
both ABSs (assets) and CDOs (liabilities)) of banks, we split securitization into two separate
categories - ABSs and CDOs - reecting that these two di¤erent classes of securitization may serve
di¤erent purposes.
If investors, banks, regulators and politicians are to make informed decisions about the future
of our nancial system, then we need the answer to the question: Why do banks securitize"? This
is the question we address in this paper.
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Anticipating our main conclusions, we show that:
1. The main driver of securitization has been liquidity i.e. the need for banks to fund their
balance sheets.
2. Funding has been of greater importance in driving the issuance of ABSs than in driving the
issuance of CDOs. For CDOs, regulatory capital has also been an important driver.
3. Banks which securitized tended to be larger than those which did not.
4. Those banks which had more rapid growth of their loan books, were more reliant on wholesale
interbank funding and had a larger gap between the size of their loan books and their deposits
were more likely to securitize.
5. Banks which securitized tended to have lower quality loan books.
6. Banks which securitized tended to have a greater proportion of non-performing loans in the
aftermath of the nancial crisis.
7. Large banks were the ones for which securitization was an important factor to explain prots
while smaller ones were the ones whose balance sheets were most highly exposed to changes
in the securitization market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the
trends in global securitization, paying specic attention to the UK. In section 2, we review the extant
literature. In sections 3 and 4, we describe the data, methodology used in this study and results,
section 5 discusses policy implications of our ndings for regulators and monetary authorities and
section 6 has the robustness analysis whilst section 7 concludes.
1.1 Trend in global securitization
Before the development of the securitization market, banks were essentially portfolio lenders using
deposits to nance loans and holding the loans until maturity (the loan-and-hold" model). Thus
loans were funded principally by deposits, and sometimes by debt, which was a direct obligation of
the bank (rather than a claim on specic assets).
Since the 1970s, the securitization market has grown exponentially with the aggregate securi-
tization volumes exceeding $2.08 trillion worldwide (as of December 31, 2005). The securitization
market in Europe was rather undeveloped until the late 1990s. Since then, there has been a signif-
icant increase in securitization activity. This increase may be linked to factors such as the greater
integration of European nancial markets as well as a shift towards a more market-based nancial
system. Figure 1 shows the growth of the European securitization market between 2000 and 2010.
The market reached its peak in 2008 i.e. at the start of the nancial crisis.
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Figure 1: Total securitization in Europe and US between 2000 - 2010 Source - SIFMA
1.2 UK securitization market
Securitization in the UK has been on the increase since the end of 1990s (see Figure 2). Between
2002 and 2008, there was a dramatic increase in securitization activity. Since then, there has been
an almost equally dramatic contraction.
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Figure 2: UK bank securitization 2000 - 2010; Source SIFMA
Since 2008, some regulators and political commentators have blamed securitization as being
one of the main catalysts for the nancial crisis. A popular viewpoint has been that banks have
embraced securitization mainly for regulatory capital arbitrage 1 . Until recently, under the Basel
I framework (Jackson et al. (1999)), the minimum capital that banks needed to retain was a very
rough function of the level of risk held on their balance sheets. For example, a loan to a borrower
needed 8% of capital, no matter what the risk of the borrower. In 1999 banking supervisors engaged
in a thorough revision of the capital regulatory framework. This lead to the Basel II framework
in which the capital requirements of banks were thought to be better aligned with the risk prole
of their portfolios. Thus, banks were expected to hold a higher level of capital for loans granted
to higher-risk borrowers. As a consequence of the 2007-2008 nancial crisis, regulators are now
discussing ways to implement a new regulatory (Basel III) framework to account for the main
drawbacks of the Basel II framework.
2 Literature review
In this section, we review the extant literature on securitization.
DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) conduct a theoretical analysis of securitization.
1Regulatory capital arbitrage is any transaction that has little or no economic impact on a nancial institution
while either increasing its capital or decreasing its regulatory capital requirement.
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These papers build a model for security design which, although not specically designed for the
securitization market, ts important applications such as asset-backed securities. They show that
liquidity (a banks need to fund its balance sheet) is an important driver for security design.
There has not been a large number of empirical studies which have tried to shed some light on
why banks use securitization. Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) is a notable exception. They use a
Logit regression model applied to data on 408 Spanish banks to investigate the causes of the growth
of securitization in Spain. Their results show that liquidity and the search for improved performance
are the decisive factors for securitization, whilst they nd very little evidence supporting credit risk
transfer and regulatory capital arbitrage as motivating reasons. This result is consistent with the
predictions of the DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) model (i.e. the desire for low-cost funding incentivizes
the growth of the securitization market).
Dionne and Harchaoui (2008), using data for Canadian banks, investigate the e¤ects of securiti-
zation (rather than the reasons for it) on the risks incurred by the banks. They conclude that there
is a positive relation between securitization and banksrisk (dened to include interest rate risk,
market risk, liquidity risk and credit risk, as well as systemic risks). Furthermore, they empirically
show that securitization has a negative impact on Tier 1 capital2 . Although this study makes an
important contribution to the empirical literature, it does not address the fundamental question of
why Canadian banks use securitization in the rst place.
Hänsel and Krahnen (2007) investigate whether the use of credit derivatives a¤ects the risk taken
by large banks. Using a unique data-set of European Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), they
nd that the issuance of CDOs tends to raise the systematic risk (equity beta) of the issuing
bank. They also perform a cross-sectional analysis to identify the determinants of the change in
systematic risk and nd that equity beta increases signicantly if the issuing bank is nancially
weak (low protability and high leverage). Overall, their ndings suggest that credit securitization
goes hand in hand with an increase in the risk appetite of the issuing bank.
A¢ nito and Tagliaferri (2008) investigate the determinants for loan securitization in Italy using
data for Italian banks over the period 2000 to 2006. They show that, although securitization is
a composite decision, capital requirements play a driving role, suggesting that Basel I may have
created perverse regulatory incentives to move exposures o¤ the balance sheet. The empirical results
conrm the widespread opinion that bank securitization was a mechanism to engage in regulatory
capital arbitrage. The main issue with that study is that, compared with other countries such
as the USA, the UK and Spain, securitization in Italy has never been a widespread phenomenon.
Indeed, Italian banks have mainly used customers deposits to nance their loan positions and
the securitization market has been concentrated in the hands of a very small percentage of Italian
banks. Therefore, the main conclusion of A¢ nito and Tagliaferri (2008) might not be applicable in
other countries.
Purnanandam (2011) investigates the originate-to-distribute (OTD) model of bank lending in
the US and concludes that lack of borrower screening, coupled with leverage-induced risk-taking,
contributed signicantly to the sub-prime mortgage crisis.
Loutskina and Strahant (2009) consider the volume of jumbo mortgage originations relative to
non jumbo originations and nd that it increases with bank holdings of liquid assets and decreases
with bank deposit costs. This result suggests that the increasing depth of the mortgage secondary
market fostered by securitization has reduced the e¤ect of a lenders nancial condition on credit
2Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a banks nancial strength from a regulators point of view. It is composed
of core capital, which consists primarily of common stock and disclosed reserves (or retained earnings), but may also
include non-redeemable non-cumulative preferred stock.
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supply. Uzun and Webb (2007), using a panel of 112 banks in the US which use securitization
and a matched panel of banks which did not use securitization, nd that bank size is a signicant
determinant of whether a bank securitized its loans and it is negatively related to the banks capital
ratios3 . This provides some support for the hypothesis that securitization is linked to regulatory
capital arbitrage.
To summarize, we conclude that there is still mixed evidence of why banks use securitization.
3 Description of the data
The data-set used in this study, constructed using Bloomberg and Bankscope, covers the securitiza-
tion market in the UK during the period 2000 to 2010. This data-set includes annual accounts for
690 UK banks. The (annual) data-set covers commercial banks, real estate and mortgage banks,
investment banks, securities rms, investment and trust corporations, specialized governmental
credit institutions, Islamic banks, non-banking credit institutions, all types of bank holdings in the
UK, micro-nancing institutions, private banking institutions, asset management institutions, re-
tail nance companies, clearing and custody institutions, group nance companies and corporative
banks.
Table 1 shows the composition of our data-set (over the period 2000-2010) by specialization:
Table 1: The number of UK banks per specialisation for period 2000 - 2010
.
3These are ratios measuring a banks nancial stability, where, as a general rule, the higher the ratio the better
the banks nancial position. A standard capital ratio is:
Total Capital Adequacy Ratio which is dened as Tier 1 Capital plus Tier 2 Capital divided by risk-weighted
assets (see section 3.2.2).
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The largest single group of banks are commercial banks (225 banks), while savings banks (7
banks) are the smallest group. The other groups of banks are real estate and mortgage banks (82
banks), investment banks (70 banks) and securities rms (69 banks). The remaining 237 banks
are all included under other specializations (Islamic banks, cooperative banks, non-banking credit
institutions, bank holdings, central banks, micro-nancing, private banking and asset management
banks, nance companies, specialized governmental credit institutions, and multilateral government
banks). A number of commercial banks and securities rms had their last information available for
the year 2008, which is, perhaps, an indication of the e¤ect of the nancial crisis on the banking
sector.
3.1 UK bank data
We divide the data-set into two main sub-samples. The rst sample contains data for banks that
recorded at least one securitization activity during the period 2000-2010. The second group contains
data for banks that did not use securitization at all. We note that 527 banks issued securities at least
once between 2000 to 2010. Table 2 shows the percentage4 of banks using securitization. We can
see that the highest percentage of securitization activity was recorded by investment banks; 97% of
the total number of investment banks securitized at least once between 2000 and 2010. Commercial
banks have the lowest percentage (71%)5 . The high proportion of real estate and mortgage banks,
securities rms, investment banks and even savings banks involved in securitization, suggests that
most UK banks have been actively involved in securitization in the last decade. Hence, in the main,
UK banks may no longer be deposit takers with a "loan-and-hold" business model but instead
have become originators of loans and issuers of securities with an "originate-to-distribute" business
model. Two of the main contributions of this paper are to shed some light on what caused the
change in business model and how the change impacted on banksdefault rates after the nancial
crisis.
4The percentage of securitizing banks is computed as the number of securitizing banks at a given time divided by
the number of banks considered in the data at the same time
For example:
Number of securitiz ing commercia l banks in 2000
total number of commercia l banks in 2000 =
27
41
= 66%
5The total percentage of banks securitizing within the given bank specialisation is calculated as follows
Total number of securitiz ing commercia l banks b etween 2000 and 2010
total number of commercia l banks b etween 2000 and 2010 =
159
225
= 71%
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3.2 Denition of Variables:
The total amount of securitization6 for each bank is constructed from the reported information in
the Bankscope database (which comes from banksannual accounts) on an annual basis for the
period 2000 to 2010.
In the rst part of this study, we build on Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) and consider variables
which are good proxies for funding (i.e. liquidity risk), regulatory capital arbitrage and credit risk
transfer.
We now discuss these proxies in detail.
3.2.1 Funding as motivator for securitization (Li, i = 1 to 6)
Some of the empirical studies cited earlier nd that funding (liquidity risk) is an important driver
of securitization. We study the e¤ect of six di¤erent measures of liquidity on whether banks chose
to securitize or not.
Interbank Ratio (L1): The rst proxy for liquidity that we use is the Interbank Ratio. This
is dened as the money lent to other banks divided by the money borrowed from other banks (all
our proxies are expressed as a percentage). If one views customer deposits as core funding, i.e. a
stable source of funds, then a measure of the liquidity risk that banks face is the degree to which
banks rely on interbank (i.e. wholesale money-market) funding. The Interbank Ratio is shown in
the formula below (money due from banks divided by money due to banks - here, due means the
money owed irrespective of whether the time of payment has arrived or not):
(L1)
An Interbank Ratio greater than 100, means that the bank is a net liquidity provider to the
rest of the banking sector i.e. the bank is a net placer rather than a net borrower of funds in the
market and therefore it is more liquid. An Interbank Ratio smaller than 100 implies that the bank
is a net liquidity buyer. For the largest banks in the world, the average interbank ratio is 74.6%
(see table 5). These large banks, in aggregate, are net borrowers from the interbank market, relying
on smaller banks, postal savings banks and credit unions, etc., to supply them with the funding
necessary to support their loan portfolios.
Liquid Assets/Customer Deposits and Short term funding (L2): In the second proxy, we
consider the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short term funding. The numerator is computed
from all reserve assets (and hence implicitly assumes that all are equally liquid). This ratio can be
considered as a deposit run o¤ ratio since it is a proxy for what percentage of customer deposits
and short term funding could be met if they were withdrawn suddenly. The higher this ratio, the
6This is the sum of securities (i.e. Asset-Backed Securities (ABSs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs))
issued by each bank and is constructed from the reported information in the Bankscope database on an annual basis
for the period 2000 to 2010.
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more liquid the bank is and the less vulnerable it is to a classic run on the bank. The world average
ratio is 21% (see table 5).
(L2)
Liquid assets/Total deposits and Borrowing (L3): This ratio is the total amount of liquid
assets available divided by the sum of deposits and borrowing.
Net Loans/Deposits & Short term funding (L4): The fourth proxy for liquidity is the ratio
of net loans to deposits and short term funding. This is often called reserves-to-deposits. In this
ratio, all loans are considered equally illiquid (which is clearly a strong assumption). A higher ratio
indicates a less liquid bank. The world average of loans to deposits is about 68.5% (see table 5).
(L4)
Net loans/Total Assets (L5): The ratio of net loans to total assets indicates what percentage
of the assets of the bank are tied up in loans. The higher the ratio the less liquid the bank is.
Net Loans/ Total deposits and Borrowing (L6): This is a similar ratio to the previous one.
The main di¤erence is that the denominator is now replaced by total deposits and borrowing.
(L6)
3.2.2 Regulatory Capital Arbitrage (Cj, j = 1 to 7)
The second group of variables that we consider (a total of seven) are proxies for regulatory capital
arbitrage.
Capital funds/Customer deposits and S.T. Funding (C1): Capital funds are dened as the
sum of equity capital, hybrid capital and long-term subordinated debt. The ratio of capital funds
to customer and short term funding is dened as below.
(C1)
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Capital funds/Net loans (C2): We also consider the ratio of capital funds to net loans. The
ratio is given by:
(C2)
Capital Funds/Total Assets (C3): This ratio is a measure of the general nancial soundness
of the capital structure. The higher the ratio, the better is the solvency position of the bank.
(C3)
Equity/Liabilities (C4): This leverage ratio is simply another way of looking at the equity
funding of the balance sheet and is an alternative measure of capital adequacy.
(C4)
Equity/Total Assets (C5): The equity to total assets ratio measures the amount of equity
protection that a bank has in place against loan impairment. The higher this ratio, the more
protection the bank has. The ratio is computed as:
(C5)
Tier 1 ratio (C6): Tier 1 ratio measures shareholder funds plus perpetual non cumulative pref-
erence shares as a percentage of risk weighted assets and o¤ balance sheet risks as measured under
the Basel rules. This should be at least 4%.7 . Tier I Capital is the actual contributed equity plus
retained earnings. It is used to describe the capital adequacy of a bank (it is its core capital).
Generally, shareholders equity and retained earnings are referred to as "Core" Tier 1 capital 8 .
This ratio is given by:
7The Basel I agreement stipulated that Tier 1 capital should be a minimum of 4% although anecdotal evidence
suggests that most investors will generally require a ratio of 10% or more in the aftermath of the nancial crisis. The
proposal in Basel III will increase Tier 1 capital during the January 2015 phase, from 4% to 6%.
8This include: common stockholdersequity, perpetual preferred stock, redeemable securities of subsidiary trusts,
accumulated net gains on cash ow hedges, intangible assets, goodwill, other disallowed intangible assets, investment
in certain subsidiaries among others
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(C6)
Total Capital Adequacy Ratio (C7): The nal variable that we consider is the Total Capital
Adequacy Ratio. This is the sum of Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital divided by risk weighted assets9 .
(expressed as a percentage). Under the Basel II and III frameworks, this ratio should be at least
8%. It is calculated internally by the bank in question. The Total Capital Adequacy Ratio is a
measure of the amount of a banks core capital expressed as a percentage of its assets weighted by
its credit exposure and is calculated as:
(C7)
3.2.3 Credit risk transfer (Rk, k = 1 to 6))
Credit risk is the risk that a counter-party will default or delay payment on an obligation or that
the value of a ow of payments will decline due to an adverse movement in the counter-partys
credit rating. Securitization o¤ers banks the opportunity to transfer credit risk to third parties.
We consider six credit risk ratios.
Impaired (doubtful) loans/Equity (R1): These are loans that may not be recovered and are
not covered by equity. This indicates the weakness of the loan portfolio relative to the banks
capital. The higher this percentage, the worse is the banks position.
Non-performing Loans/Gross Loans (R2): This ratio is a measure of the amount of total
loans which are doubtful. The lower the ratio, the better the quality of the assets.
(R2)
Loan loss /Net interest (R3): This ratio shows the relationship between the loan loss and the
net interest income over the same period.
9Risk-weighted assets are a banks assets weighted according to credit risk. Some assets, such as debentures,
are assigned a higher risk than others such as government bonds. Banks assets are classied and grouped in ve
categories according to credit risk, carrying risk weights of zero (for example, home country sovereign debt), twenty,
fty, eighty and up to one hundred percent (the latter category has, for example, most corporate debt). Banks with
an international presence are required to hold capital equal to 8% of risk-weighted assets.
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Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans (R4): The fourth ratio we consider is the loan loss reserve
to gross loans. This ratio indicates how much of the total portfolio has been provided for but not
charged o¤. It is a reserve for losses expressed as percentage of total loans. The higher the ratio,
the poorer the quality of the loan portfolio.
(R4)
Unreserved Impaired (doubtful) Loans/ Equity (R5): These are loans that may not be
recovered and are not covered by reserves. It shows what percentage of the banks capital would be
written o¤ if the accumulated impairment reserves were 100% of impaired loans and how vulnerable
a banks capital ratio would be as a result.
Net Charge-o¤s/ Average Gross Loans (R6): We dene a charge-o¤ as a debt that has been
determined uncollectible by the original creditor, usually after the debtor has become seriously
delinquent. Charge-o¤s often occur after six months of non-payment.
(R6)
The net charge-o¤ to average loans ratio indicates what percentage of the loan portfolio has
been cancelled by the balance sheet as it is considered denitely not recoverable. The lower the
ratio, the better is the banks position.
3.2.4 The control variables
For control purposes, we also include a general characteristic of the originating entity in the analysis
as an additional regressor, namely the size of the bank. We analyze the impact of bank size, which
we measure as the natural logarithm of the banks total assets.
3.3 The model
Consider the following Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for a Logit model:
Pr(Yi = 1 j Li; Cj ; Rk; ; i ; j ; k ) =
exp(+
6P
i=1
i Li;t 1 +
7P
j=1
j Cj;t 1 +
6P
k=1
k Rk;t 1)
1 + exp(+
6P
i=1
i Li;t 1 +
7P
j=1
j Cj;t 1 +
6P
k=1
k Rk;t 1)
(1)
where if bank i, i = 1; 2:::; N securitized over the period under consideration, Yi = 1, otherwise
Yi = 0.
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We let Li;t 1 denote the funding ratios, Cj;t 1 denote the regulatory capital ratios and Rk;t 1
denote the credit risk transfer ratios described above.
The general model we estimate can be written as:
Yi;t = +
6X
i=1
i Li;t 1 +
7X
j=1
j Cj;t 1 +
6X
k=1
k Rk;t 1 (2)
In the above equation, all explanatory variable are lagged one period to avoid potential problems
of endogeneity. The relationship between the dependent variable Yi and the probability p that a
bank records a securitization activity over a period of one year is given by:
p = Pr(Yi = 1 j Li; Cj ; Rk; ; i ; j ; k ) =
eYi
1 + eYi
=
1
1 + e Yi
: (3)
Table 3 below shows the expected signs for the explanatory variables in the model above. We
expect that the rst three ratios measuring liquidity (interbank ratio, liquid assets to deposits
and short term funding and liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing) should make a negative
contribution to the probability of securitization while we expect that the remaining three ratios
should make a positive contribution. The regulatory capital ratios are all expected to be negative
while the credit risk transfer ratios and the control variable representing banks size are all expected
to be positive.
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Table 3: Expected sign for the model
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4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
We start with some descriptive statistics of our sample of UK banks (there are 690 banks in total)
which we split into two sub-samples: banks that securitized at least once during the period 2000
to 2010 (a total of 527 banks - see Table 4a) and those that did not participate in securitization at
all during the period 2000 to 2010 (consisting of 163 banks - see Table 4b).
We make some general observations. We note that the Interbank Ratio (L1) is lower in banks
that did not securitize their assets (42.2% for non securitizing banks against 73.6% for securitizing).
The Interbank Ratio for both samples are signicantly less than 100. Hence, UK banks, in aggregate,
are net liquidity buyers. We may be able to interpret this result as tentative evidence that banks
turn to securitization as a source of funds.
The mean percentage of liquid assets to deposits and short term funding (L2) is 53.9% for banks
that are involved in securitization compared to 59.7% for those that did not securitize. This may
suggest that UK banks are, generally, highly liquid (the ratios are higher than the world average
ratio, 21%-see table 5)10 . The ratio is lower for banks that used securitization. The other liquidity
ratios (net loans to deposits and short-term funding) give similar results. Again, these results may
tentatively suggest that UK banks are using securitization to raise funds. It is also important to
note that the ratios for both groups of banks are less than the world ratio (68.5%) which would
conrm the high liquidity of UK banks in comparison to the world average.
We now consider the credit risk transfer ratios. We start with the loan loss reserve to gross
loans (R4). This ratio is 5.1% for banks that use securitization compared with 1% for banks that
do not use it. The world average (see Table 5) is 2%. This may indicate that the quality of loans
issued by UK banks that securitize are not, in general, of good quality, and thus banks may resort
to securitization in order to transfer credit risk.
The non-performing loans to the gross loans ratio (R2) is 5% for banks that use securitization
versus 0.38% for banks that did not use it. Again, this result may suggest that securitization is
used as a way to transfer credit risk. Banks that did not securitize have a lower ratio which may
imply that their assets are of higher quality.
Finally, we consider the regulatory capital ratios. Banks that use securitization (see table 4 (a))
have, on average, a lower Total Capital Adequacy Ratio (C7) than those that do not (see table
4 (b)) use it (3.8% against 4.6%). It is also important to note that in both cases, the ratio is
signicantly lower than the minimum 8% expected under Basel II. Both the two groups (i.e. banks
that use securitization and those that do not use) have lower Tier 1 ratio (C6) than the required
Basel IIs minimum requirement of 4%. We note that under Basel III the Tier 1 ratio is expected
to be 6%.
The equity to total asset ratio (C5) is lower for banks that use securitization than banks that
do not use it (22% versus 29%). Thus, banks using securitization seem to have a lower cushion or
protection than banks that do not use it.
Banks which use securitization are, on average, larger (7.6 against 5.4) than those which do not.
10Table 5 shows the world averages values of ratios available in Bank-scope. 30,052 banks have been used from
north America, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Middle East, Africa, Oceania.
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4.2 Empirical Results
Following Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) (but note that we use more variables than in that study),
we t the model in Equation (1) using a Logit model. Before proceeding with the estimation of the
model, we test for evidence of correlation amongst the variables in the model and nd no evidence
that multicollinearity is a problem in our data. Table 6 shows the results of our empirical analysis.
Five out of the six liquidity ratios are statistically signicant and generally with the expected
sign. The Interbank Ratio (L1) and the liquid assets to customer deposits and short term funding
(L2) are statistically signicant (at 5% and at 10%) and have the expected sign. Net loans to
deposits and short term funding (L4) is signicant (at 10%) with the expected sign. Net loans to
total assets (L5) and net loans to total deposits and borrowing (L6) are statistically signicant but
do not have the expected sign.
We now turn to the regulatory capital ratios. The Tier 1 ratio (C6) and the Total Capital
Adequacy Ratio (C7) are signicant and both have the expected sign.
Size is statistically signicant in each case.
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Table 6: Probit and Logit Models; *signicance at 1%; **signicance at 5%;***signicance at 10%.%
The Logit model suggests that liquidity is the most important driver of securitization in the UK
while it generates weaker evidence that UK banks have used securitization for regulatory capital
arbitrage and for credit risk transfer.
Overall the results in Table 6, using the Logit model, conrm our expectations (see table 3). We
expect a higher probability that a bank will securitize when the Interbank Ratio is lower or when
the size of the loans issued by the bank are large relative to the banks deposits and short-term
funding (i.e. the bank is less liquid). To further check these results we now use a Binary Probit
model. Results are reported in Table 6, left-hand-side panel.
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Overall, the Binary Probit model is supportive of the hypothesis that liquidity is an important
factor. Three of the liquidity ratios are signicant (at 10%) and all have the expected sign.
However, there is now evidence that regulatory capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer cannot
be neglected11 . Four out of the seven regulatory capital arbitrage ratios are now signicant (and
all four have the expected sign) and two of those are signicant at 5%. Four out of the six credit
risk transfer ratios are now signicant (and all four have the expected sign) and two of those are
signicant at 1%.
4.3 Results using ABS and CDO data
In this section we rene our denition of securitization and split the data by separately considering
ABSs and CDOs. Limited somewhat by data availability, we now use data for 231 banks issuing
ABSs and for 335 banks issuing CDOs. Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) remark that since CDOs
are related to the banksportfolio of liabilities, credit risk transfer should not to be a motivating
factor for these securities while it should be an important factor for ABSs12 .
The ABS and CDO markets in the UK both grew substantially in the ve years prior to 2008
to become some of the largest in the world which merits an investigation into the determinants of
such growth.
We follow broadly the same approach as in the previous section. However, we now use fewer
variables (four as proxies for liquidity, four as proxies for regulatory capital arbitrage and three as
proxies for credit risk transfer) - mainly to reect the availability of data.
Firstly, we consider ABSs for which our data-set consists of 231 banks.
Table 7 shows the empirical results. We, initially, discuss the results of the Logit model. When
we split the data down the ABS and CDO dimensions, it seems that the need for funding may be a
less signicant factor. The Interbank Ratio (L1) is no longer signicant and two of the three ratios
which generate signicant coe¢ cients do not have the expected sign.
Turning to the regulatory capital ratios, the Tier 1 ratio (C6) and the Total Capital Adequacy
Ratio (C7) are signicant at 5% and both have the expected sign.
The Binary Probit model shows qualitatively similar results but the Interbank Ratio is not
highly signicant. The credit risk transfer ratios are insignicant for the Logit model but two out
of three are signicant (Impaired Loans/Equity (R1) at 10% (but not with the expected sign) and
Loan Loss reserve/ Gross Loans (R4) at 5%) when the Probit model is used. Thus, there is now
evidence that risk transfer seems also to be a motivating factor for the growth of the market for
ABSs in the UK.
Thus, regulatory capital arbitrage does seem to play an important role while there is some
empirical evidence that ABSs have also been used to transfer credit risk.
11We have also repeated the same empirical exercise by estimating a special case of the model where we consider
one variable at a time. The results (unreported for brevity but available on request) were qualitatively unchanged.
12However, we believe that this remark is too strong. In fact, CDOs, especially synthetic CDOs, are also used as
credit risk transfer vehicles.
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Table 7: ABS Market. *, **, and *** are coe¢ cient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
We now turn to CDOs for which our data-set consists of 335 banks covering the period 2004-2010.
Table 8 shows the empirical results for CDOs. We, initially, discuss the Logit model. Although
funding seems, once again, to be an important driver of CDO growth in the UK, regulatory capital
arbitrage seems also important in understanding the growth of these nancial securities. Two out of
four regulatory capital ratios are statistically signicant (Capital funds/Net loans (at 5%) and Tier
1 ratio (at 10%)) but only one of these is correctly signed (Tier 1 ratio). The Binary Probit model
reinforces the previous results. Thus, although the search for cheap funding seems to be relevant,
the growth of CDOs in the UK may have also been driven by regulatory capital arbitrage. This
is an important and new result with possible policy implications for governments and regulators.
Credit risk transfer does not seem to be a motivating factor for the large expansion of the issuance
of these securities in the UK.
The di¤erences between the factors driving the growth of the ABS and CDO markets are best
captured by comparing and contrasting tables 7 and 8. They show that the twelve variables we
consider produce adjusted R-squared values of around 87% to 91%. The di¤erences are that regu-
latory capital arbitrage is somewhat more important for CDOs than for ABSs whereas funding and
credit risk transfer are somewhat more important for ABSs than for CDOs.
The size of the bank seems to be a determinant factor to explain the growth of securitization
in the UK regardless of the methodology used. This is also a noteworthy result. To put it another
24
way, large banks (perhaps, too-big-to-fail or the so-called G-SIFIs (Global Systemically Important
Financial Institutions)) are more likely to securitize - and this remark applies to ABSs and (even
more to) CDOs.
Summarizing the empirical results reported above, we conclude that i) the search for funding
is the predominant reason why UK banks used the securitization market (this result is also in line
with theoretical models such as DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) and DeMarzo (2005)) and ii) regulatory
capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer have also played an important role and therefore these
factors cannot be neglected. The latter result contrasts with some of the empirical papers cited
earlier which nd the search for funding being the only driver of securitization13 .
Table 8: CDO;*, **, and *** are coe¢ cient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
4.4 The E¤ect of the originate-to-distribute Model (OTD) on Banks
Defaults
We examine the role of credit risk transfer in greater depth by considering what happened to banks,
using the OTD model, in the aftermath of the 2007 nancial crisis. The empirical results in the
previous section show that, at least in part, UK banks used the securitization market to transfer
13However, these studies do not refer to the UK market but rather the Spanish and Italian markets.
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credit risk. However, at the onset of the nancial crisis in the summer of 2007, the securitization
market suddenly became frozen and therefore banks were unable to further securitize their assets.
This would have left them with considerable credit risk that they were unable to transfer to third
parties - at exactly the time that banks were facing dramatically increased funding and credit risks.
In order to quantify this, we follow Purnanandam (2011) and estimate the e¤ect of the OTD model
on banksABS and CDO annualised default rates using the following bank xed-e¤ect model:
defaultit = i + 1aftert + 2aftert  preotdi +
k=KX
k=1
kXit + it (4)
The dependent variable in equation (4) above measures the default rate of the portfolio of bank
i in year t. Following Purnanandam (2010), we use net charge-o¤s (net of recoveries) as a proxy
for the default rate14 . The intercept i is the bank xed e¤ect, while Xit is a vector of bank
characteristics15 . The variable preotdt is a time invariant variable measuring the extent of the
banks participation in the Originate-to-distribute (OTD) market. This is measured by the volume
of CDOs (or ABSs) originated by a bank between 2004 to 2010 scaled by the banks position in
CDOs (or ABSs) at the beginning of the year. The variable aftert is a dummy variable taking the
value one in the period after the nancial crisis began and zero otherwise. Thus, the coe¢ cient
on this variable captures the time trend in default rate before and after the nancial crisis16 The
coe¢ cient on the interaction term (i.e., aftert  preotdi) measures the change in net charge-o¤s
around the crisis period across banks with varying intensities of participation in the OTD market
prior to the crisis. Thus, 2 measures the change in default rate for banks that originated loans
primarily to sell them to third parties, as compared with the corresponding change for banks that
originated loans primarily to retain them on their own balance sheets.
4.4.1 Empirical Results
Table 9(a) and 9(b) present the empirical results of the model in equation (4).
14Due to data limitation we cannot use non-performing assets. Net charge-o¤ indicates the percentage of the asset
issued by the bank that may have been nally written o¤ the book. Thus it is an appropriate proxy for the default
rate.
15We use some of the same variables used before.
16We consider the period 2004 to 2007 as the period before the nancial crisis while 2008 - 2010 as the period after
the nancial crisis.
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Table 9(a): Default rate for ABS issued 2004 -2010; *, **, and *** are coe¢ cient signicance
at 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table 9(b): Default rate for CDOs issued period 2004 - 2010; *, **, and *** are coe¢ cient
signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
We note that 1 is signicant at 1% both in the case of ABSs and CDOs. This tells us that the
nancial crisis has been a contributing factor to the increase in default rates su¤ered by UK banks.
2 is also statistically signicant and positive. This means that the banks that were using an OTD
model before the nancial crisis, were the ones to su¤er the most from defaults after the nancial
crisis. We remark that the 2 coe¢ cient is much larger for ABSs (0.5778) compared to CDOs
(0.0142). This indicated that banks had a much larger proportion of ABSs written o¤ after the
nancial crisis (compared to CDOs). Finally, banks that used the OTD (Originate-to-distribute)
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model (as opposed to the traditional loan-and-hold" model) before the nancial crisis were the
ones to su¤er the most (in terms of defaults) after the nancial crisis. We attribute this to the fact
that the market for ABSs was frozen abruptly in the summer of 2007 and hence they were unable
to sell o¤ their securitized loans and su¤ered the consequences.
4.5 Protability of UK banks that securitized
As we have already remarked, UK banks have been heavily involved in the securitization market. In
this section we aim to investigate how the securitization market has impacted on banksprotability
in the UK. We split banks into two groups - the rst group consists of commercial and savings banks
and the second group consists of investment and real estate banks. Closely following Jiangli and
Pritsker (2008), we consider the following linear model for a measure of protability, Rate of Return
on Operating Assets (RROA):
RROAit = i +
4X
s=1
'isMis + 
2X
g=1
!isGig (5)
where RROAit is the protability ratio Rate of Return on Operating Assets for bank i at a
given year t, Mis, s = 1,2; 3; 4; are measures of securitization considered in the study (ABSs and
CDOs issued, total assets and Loans) and Gig, g = 1; 2; represents the group classication of the
banks that securitized and where the parameter  takes the value 1 for the group of commercial
and savings banks and 0 for the group of investment and real estate banks.
We start with the results presented in the rst four rows of Table 10 (which do not di¤erentiate
between the type of bank but, instead, di¤erentiate on whether the bank securitized or not). The
results in table 10 indicate that large banks are the ones for which securitization is more important
to explain prots. Furthermore, all the coe¢ cients on the variables used are signicant and with
the correct sign. More interesting is that the measure, relating to total assets, is larger for the
securitizing banks (50.59%) than for the non securitizing (1.42%). This may imply that banks
which securitized depended on securitization to increase their overall prots.
The size of the coe¢ cients on the variables used in Table 10 is generally larger for commercial
and savings banks as opposed to investment and real estate banks. This result shows that com-
mercial and savings banks were more exposed to the securitization market than investment and
real estate banks (i.e. their balance sheets were more sensitive to changes in the conditions of the
securitization market). Therefore, while investment banks were the ones for which securitization
was more important to explain prots, commercial and savings banks are the ones more exposed
to price uctuations in this market17 - and, of course, the price uctuations were greatest during
the nancial crisis.
17To account for endogeneity between banks protability and securitization, we have also repeated the empirical
exercise in Table 10 using GMM but results were qualitatively unchanged.
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Table 10: Protability of UK banks 2004 -2010; *, **, and *** are coe¢ cient signicance at 1%, 5%
and 10%.
5 Policy Relevance of our Results
Given that central banks can be expected to continue accepting ABSs as collateral in their funding
operations for the foreseeable future. Given this, our empirical ndings have potentially signicant
policy implications for regulators and central banks.
The key result we observed is that liquidity is the most important driver of securitization for UK
banks, ahead of regulatory capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer. This is not to underestimate
the motivating inuence of the latter two factors, but it does put in perspective the value of
securitization as a funding tool in the nancial markets. The other key result we noted was the
higher probability that a bank will securitize when its interbank ratio is lower (that is, when it is
a net borrower from the interbank market).
In the rst instance we conclude that securitization will remain an important technique for
funding purposes. The emphasis on bank funding models in the post-2008 environment is for
a reduced reliance on unsecured short-term wholesale funding, and greater reliance on customer
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deposits and secured long-term wholesale funds. It is reasonable to expect that securitization
markets will form part of the latter, either in the form of ABSs or Covered Bonds.
The Basel III and FSA liquidity regimes place a greater emphasis on secured funding, which
banks are addressing by embarking on asset enablement programmes, to ensure that su¢ cient
collateral is available for use in secured funding transactions. Our ndings suggest that it is imper-
ative for banks with interbank ratios lower than 100% to make asset enablement a priority. The
long-term signicance of this is considerable: some banks will have to modify their business models
substantially before they are in a position to originate only assets that are viable for use as secured
collateral. Banks that are not able to do this, and still wish to run customer loan-deposit ratios
greater than 100%, will remain net borrowers from the interbank market. In the long run this will
add substantially to their costs, because their liquid asset bu¤er requirement will be higher.
The other side of this is the impact on the bank funding model. As the share of encumbered
assets grows as banks move to secured funding, including securitization, the position of senior unse-
cured and subordinated debt holders worsens as the encumbrance ratio worsens and the loss-given-
default value in a bankruptcy event rises higher. This has implications for the long-term viability of
unsecured long-term debt from an investor perspective, and will result in higher unsecured funding
costs. Ultimately, the requirements of the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR) suggest that banks will need to continue to employ securitization as part of
their long-term liquidity funding strategy.
Regulators may need to provide incentives for banks to invest in ABS tranches to ensure that
non-bank investors continue to remain engaged in the market. If a transaction is not undertaken for
risk transfer purposes, the originator can retain the junior tranche but mezzanine tranches may not
nd institutional investors and have to be placed with banks. The regulatory capital risk weighting
on these tranches may be a disincentive for banks to purchase them.
For securitization to produce any regulatory capital benet requires that banks demonstrate
signicant risk transferarising from the transaction. Therefore if the primary motivation for the
structure is to transfer credit risk, rather than raise funding or generate regulatory capital arbitrage,
it would be more appropriate to consider a synthetic securitization. This would avoid the need to
nd cash investors for the deal.
We remarked above that regulators may need to provide incentives for banks to invest in ABS
tranches. Other incentives or disincentives are also possible: In 2010, the UK government introduced
a tax on banks proportional to their volume of short-term wholesale funding as a mechanism to
try to reduce their reliance upon it. It is worthy of note that the savings rate of UK citizens is
rather lower than that of citizens in Germany and Italy, for example, and much lower than that in
Asian countries such as Japan and China. The UK government might consider tax incentives for
UK citizens to save a greater proportion of their incomes. This would have the e¤ect of increasing
the pool of savings which might be deposited with UK banks. Tax incentives to encourage private
saving might be politically easier to implement than incentives for banks to issue or invest in ABS
tranches.
6 Robustness analysis
In this section we present robustness checks on the main results presented above. Firstly, to
account for possible outliers, we use robust regression (see Tables 11(a) and 11(b)). Secondly, we
have considered two dummy variables in the model. The two dummy variables enable us to see
how the characteristic of a bank (commercial bank or savings bank) a¤ects its decision to securitize
31
its loans. We start with CDOs (see table 11(a)). The results in Table 11(a) conrm what we
reported earlier: While the search for funding is an important element in explaining the growth
of the securitization market in the UK, regulatory capital arbitrage and risk transfer cannot be
neglected. All the coe¢ cients have the expected sign. While both the two dummy variables are
signicant, savings banks seem to be the ones more willing to implement a liability securitization
program. This result is in line with the analysis of Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) for Spanish
banks and in line with the results in Table 10.
We now turn to the ABS market. Results in Table 11 (b) are in line with results in Table 11
(a). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that neither of the two dummy variables are now signicant.
In addition to the robustness results reported in this section, we have used a battery of additional
tests (GMM, Panel OLS with both random and xed e¤ects) and results (unreported) are similar
to the ones reported in this paper.
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Table 11 (a): CDO robust regression variables.*, **, and *** are coe¢ cient signicance
at 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table 11 (b): ABS robust regression variables.*, **, and *** are coe¢ cient signicance
at 1%, 5% and 10%.
7 Conclusion
This study has analysed the reasons why UK banks securitize or did securitize during the period
before the 2007 nancial crisis. We have shown that the search for liquidity (i.e. the need to fund
their balance sheets) has been the principal motive for UK banks to securitize. We have also shown
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that regulatory capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer have played a role, albeit a smaller one,
in the decision of banks to securitize. We have shown that banks which issued more asset-backed
securities (ABSs) before the nancial crisis su¤ered more defaults after the nancial crisis. We
attribute this to the fact that the market for ABSs was frozen abruptly in the summer of 2007 and
hence they were unable to sell o¤ their loans and su¤ered the consequences as the credit-crunch
and the global nancial crisis took their toll on the quality of the banksloan books.
Finally, we showed that large banks were the ones for which securitization was more important
to explain prots while commercial and savings banks were the ones whose balance sheets were the
most exposed (and highly sensitive) to changes in the conditions of the securitization market.
As Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) note in their study, since the credit-crunch started in the
summer of 2007, "more and more banks have been seen to underwrite their own securitization
programs in order to use them as a guarantee to obtain funding from the European Central Bank
(ECB)". Already extant securitized bonds have been used in a similar fashion. Although such
funding will require substantial "haircuts", the fact that the ECB, and other central banks, will
accept ABSs as collateral in return for funding strengthens the motivation to understand why banks
securitize and what the consequences are.
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